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Abstract: Institutions, the rules of the game that shape repeated human inter-
actions, clearly play a critical role in helping groups avoid the inefficient use 
of shared resources such as fisheries, freshwater, and the assimilative capacity 
of the environment. Institutions, however, are intimately intertwined with the 
human, social, and biophysical context within which they operate. Scholars typi-
cally are careful to take this context into account when studying institutions and 
Ostrom’s Institutional Design Principles are a case in point. Scholars have tested 
whether Ostrom’s Design Principles, which specify broad relationships between 
institutional arrangements and context, actually support successful governance 
of shared resources. This article further contributes to this line of research by 
 leveraging the notion of institutional design to outline a research trajectory 
focused on coupled infrastructure systems in which institutions are seen as one 
class of infrastructure among many that dynamically interact to produce out-
comes over time.
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1. Introduction
Many challenging problems facing modern societies involve social dilemmas 
related to natural resource and environmental governance. As readers of this 
 journal are well aware, there is a considerable body of scholarship focused on 
understanding what factors enable groups to solve social dilemmas and effec-
tively govern shared resources. Solutions to social dilemmas involve addressing 
two related problems: (1) individuals in a group face choices in which the best 
outcome can only be achieved if the group coordinates their decisions to  maximize 
the total group payoff and (2) there is no way to guarantee others will coordinate 
decisions for the benefit the group, so individuals face strong incentives to make 
a choice that is best for themselves but may have negative impacts on the group 
(Ostrom et al. 1994). Following Hardin’s (1968) seminal article on social dilem-
mas, the dominant theoretical discourse for the subsequent 20 years suggested 
that resolving social dilemmas requires the intervention of an  exogenous gover-
nance body that either solves problem 2 by directly restricting choices of actors or 
solves problem 1 by establishing and enforcing property rights.
While effective in particular situations, top-down regulation or property-
rights-based policy interventions have frequently demonstrated that the devil is 
in the practical implementation details. Critiques of these policy responses often 
describe specific circumstances related to local context that either enabled or pre-
vented their success (Von Weizsaecker et al. 2005; Acheson 2006; Clark 2006). 
This experience suggests that focusing attention on governance without consider-
ing the system in which it is embedded, in its entirety, will be misleading. As a 
result, principles of good governance derived from relatively context-free, general 
theory will be of little use in practice. Ostrom referred to this mismatch between 
a few general policy prescriptions and the huge diversity of local contexts as the 
problem of panacea thinking and called for academics and practitioners alike to 
move beyond it (Ostrom et al. 2007; Ostrom 2010).
Ostrom’s call, however, presents us with a dilemma. A significant body of 
empirical research provides us with many case studies in which communities have 
successfully solved social dilemmas in a wide variety of common pool resource 
(CPR) contexts using a wide variety of institutional arrangements. Although 
these studies provide important insights about interdependencies between gov-
ernance arrangements and context, they also challenge us to make sense of the 
variation in the data. On the one hand, we claim that simple panacea solutions 
based on general, context free theories are bound to fail. On the other, can it be 
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that each  social-ecological context requires its own fine-tuned set of institutional 
arrangements? Can such fine tuning only be achieved through relatively long-
term, dynamic co-evolutionary processes of the kind associated with examples of 
long-lived CPR systems? Can we identify robust empirical patterns across highly 
variable, detailed case studies that are useful for the analysis of modern policy 
problems? A key challenge scholars face in addressing these questions is to iden-
tify meaningful, generalizable structure within the entire range of endogenously 
generated and enforced institutional arrangements capable of governing shared 
resources.
Our goal with this paper is to explore how we might leverage ideas from 
institutional analysis and systems science to contribute to our capacity to meet 
this challenge. Specifically we build on a long tradition of research at the intersec-
tion of social and natural sciences that began with the development of the IAD 
Framework more than three decades ago (Kiser and Ostrom 1982) followed by 
the development of the notion of “social-ecological systems” (SESs) (Berkes and 
Folke 1998) through collaborations between ecologists and a range of social scien-
tists in the resilience community. Based on this early work, Anderies et al. (2004) 
subsequently developed a framework to aid in studying how the links between 
institutions, governance, and ecological systems impact the capacity SESs to cope 
with uncertainty and change. These ideas were then further developed in three 
iterations by Ostrom (2007), Poteete et al. (2010), and Ostrom (2009) into the 
so-called “SES Framework” designed to facilitate interdisciplinary research. It 
is important to emphasize that we are not proposing yet another framework. Our 
goal is to re-conceptualize and refine ideas around the existing IAD (Kiser and 
Ostrom 1982), Robustness of SES (Anderies et al. 2004) and SES (Ostrom 2009) 
Frameworks to increase our capacity to study the interdependencies between 
social, natural, technological, economic, and institutional processes that codeter-
mine outcomes in SESs.
2. Outlining the research challenge
We have opened by suggesting that attempts to identify robust patterns related 
to good governance or effective institutional arrangements across different con-
texts is difficult because their function is so intimately connected to the social- 
ecological context in which they operate. We may, however, be able to identify 
patterns regarding how combinations of various system components, e.g. belief 
systems, built and natural environments, institutional arrangements, and value 
systems generate different outcomes. To do this, we must identify an appropri-
ate unit of analysis and develop an associated set of methods. We suggest that 
an appropriate unit of analysis is the “Coupled Infrastructure System” (CIS). A 
key point to emphasize is that a powerful theoretical framework exists in the 
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework and its various exten-
sions. As Poteete et al. (2010) suggest, we as a research community must  continue 
to work together to develop conceptualizations, models, theories, tools, and 
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 methods to  actualize these existing theoretical frameworks to build systematic, 
empirically-based theories of social dilemmas related to the environment. Since 
the publication of Anderies et al. (2004), we have worked to integrate concepts 
from institutional analysis with concepts such as resilience, robustness, and non-
linear dynamics from ecology, economics, systems science, and engineering. In 
Anderies et al. (2004), we used the term public infrastructure to describe the phys-
ical infrastructure and public services required to manage the use and maintain 
the functioning of shared resources. The analytical unit of Coupled Infrastructure 
Systems extends the notion of infrastructure to various other system components 
which allows scholars to then focus on the feedback effects generated by linked 
infrastructures. In other words, dynamics are brought to the forefront. In the 
remainder of this section, we discuss methodological challenges through reflec-
tions on our efforts to empirically test Ostrom’s Institutional Design Principles 
represented by the papers in this special issue. We then turn our attention to detail-
ing how the notion of CISs maps onto existing frameworks and provides addi-
tional analytical richness for the study of the commons.
The commons research community has come a considerable distance in iden-
tifying and characterizing structure in the wide variety of institutional arrange-
ments that have been observed in practice. With “institutional arrangements” we 
refer to clusters of rules, assembled from any number of individual rules based 
on building blocks from seven rule classes (Ostrom et al. 1994) that specify what 
actions are allowed or required, what information is accessible, and how costs and 
benefits are attached to actions and outcomes. A moment’s reflection will reveal 
the challenge in identifying structure in such clusters of rules: the diversity of pos-
sible viable institutional arrangements for any given CPR dilemma is enormous, a 
point to which we will return below. Nonetheless, commons scholars have made a 
huge effort through their systematic comparison of hundreds of case studies from 
irrigation, forestry, fisheries, and ground water systems to give some meaning-
ful structure to the enormous variation in institutional arrangements  possible in 
theory and observed in practice. Ostrom developed 8 Design Principles, famil-
iar to readers of this journal, that describe broad features (i.e. structure) of rule 
clusters associated with successful CPR governance regimes and, thus, form a 
general basis for assembling rule clusters (i.e. designing institutions) capable 
of helping solve social dilemmas in CPR contexts. Ostrom later regretted using 
the term Design Principles (DPs) since they were more patterns or hypotheses 
emerging from case studies rather than blueprints for how to govern the commons 
(Ostrom et al. 2007). Nonetheless, the DPs do represent a generalizable structure 
of institutions.
Ultimately, building a stronger empirical and theoretical basis for the Design 
Principles will be required to demonstrate their value. This requires the develop-
ment and use of a systematic, robustly replicable methodology for case study 
analysis. It turns out that this is a difficult task for both practical and theoretical 
reasons. The foremost practical constraint is the magnitude of the task of system-
atically extracting data from many cases of social-ecological systems. Ideally, the 
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same data would be collected with the same protocol in many study sites around 
the world for many years. Such an endeavor would be very costly and would be 
unlikely to attract long term funding (but see Wollenberg et al. 2007). Besides the 
International Forestry Resources and Institutions project, a major undertaking that 
focused on forests, there are few examples of large scale, long term primary data 
collection (see Poteete et al. 2010, for further discussion).1 In reality, most of the 
analysis of case studies depends on the extraction of data from secondary sources 
generated by scholars who collected data using different protocols to address 
 different research questions. This makes it difficult to reconcile and compare data 
drawn from different secondary sources.
Second is the challenge of developing a robustly replicable methodology to 
“code” the cases. As Ratajczyk et al. (2016, this issue) discuss, the coding of 
qualitative data requires multiple coders who systematically apply a coding pro-
tocol and discuss their results to resolve different interpretations of the qualitative 
information. Given these challenges, it is not surprising that beyond Ostrom’s 
large-N comparative analysis conducted to develop the Design Principles, there 
have been very few studies that systematically test the design principles ‘out of 
sample’. There are several interesting examples in which scholars search for the 
occurrence of particular instantiations of the Design Principles in particular con-
texts such as irrigation in Nepal (Ostrom and Benjamin 1993), agro-pastoralism 
in Tanzania (Quinn et al. 2007), and forestry cooperatives in Peru (Morrow and 
Hull 1996). The conclusions that can be drawn from such studies are typically 
limited to demonstrating that some subset of the design principles is present and 
that one or two of those present seemed to have contributed to better governance 
in a particular situation under investigation by the authors.
Finally, supposing that the problems of reconciling data from different sec-
ondary sources and applying a coding protocol in a robustly replicable way were 
solved, we are left with the challenge of analyzing the data. Even if we limit the 
coding to presence or absence of the 8 design principles, this allows for 256 pos-
sible institutional configurations. Further, we must account for the fact that each 
of these 256 possible configurations may produce different outcomes depending 
on the context in which they operate. A useful analogy between how genes and 
gene regulatory networks guide organism development and how the DPs (a very 
simple “genetic” code for CISs) and networks of social and technological infra-
structure impact social forms is informative. The analogy suggests that a system-
atic, long term research program is needed to fully explore the roles and impacts 
of the DPs on CISs.
The work of Baggio et al. (2016) and Barnett et al. (2016) in this special issue 
is a first step in attempting to understand how institutional configurations may 
produce different outcomes depending on the context in which they operate. As 
we might expect, just as we now know with genes, the Design Principles do not 
1
 For details on the International Forestry Resources and Institutions project see http://www.ifrire-
search.net/.
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operate individually. Rather, they co-occur in particular patterns, and those con-
figurations depend on the social and biophysical context. It is important to note 
that Ostrom’s IAD framework defined the context as “external variables” that 
are held fixed for analysis. This is appropriate for analysis of short-term system 
performance. However, with the increasing focus on understanding the robustness 
and resilience of interactions between social and biophysical systems, contex-
tual variables should be viewed as part of a complex adaptive system in which 
institutional arrangements, social, and biophysical components co-determine one 
another and coevolve over time. If our interest is in the design of systems that 
are robust and resilient, we need to take into account the structure and dynamics 
of all the attributes of the system in which institutional arrangements are endog-
enously determined. We can’t view institutional arrangements as causal factors in 
isolation.
The collaborative project reported on in this special issue and our own work 
on irrigation systems (Anderies and Janssen 2013; Janssen and Anderies 2013) 
provides some insights for what an approach to study the structure and dynam-
ics of systems involving shared resource governance might look like. Our basic 
premise is that the system of interest is best viewed as a set of dynamically inter-
acting infrastructure classes in which institutions are viewed as one particular 
class. As a result, “governance” is seen not as something we do, but rather as 
an emergent feature of a coupled infrastructure system. This paper complements 
the other papers that have taken steps to grapple with the data and coding prob-
lems inherent to studying the commons (Ratajczyk et al. 2016) and uncover richer 
structure in institutional arrangements (Baggio et al. 2016) by extending existing 
frameworks to enable us to better understand the dynamic interplay between insti-
tutional structure and context. In the remainder of the paper, we flesh out both the 
rationale for and details of the proposed extensions.
3. Studying the commons through an infrastructure lens
While the IAD framework has been in use for over 30 years [e.g. at least since 
Kiser and Ostrom (1982)] and is probably the most commonly-used framework 
for thinking about institutions in social-ecological systems, there remains signifi-
cant variation in how it is applied in practice. The need for continued clarifica-
tion and sharpening of the framework is evidenced in Ostrom’s own writing. As 
part of a special feature in the Policy Studies Journal on applications of the IAD 
framework, Ostrom clarified the intellectual basis of the IAD and “discuss[ed] 
how and why the framework itself has changed over time” (Ostrom 2011, 7). The 
papers presented in this special feature can be seen as clarifying the way different 
elements that constitute the action situation, a core component of the IAD, inter-
mingle to produce outcomes in social-ecological systems.
In the same way that the IAD framework has evolved over time based on feed-
back from its users, we suggest further extensions of the Robustness Framework, 
which is grounded in the IAD (Anderies et al. 2004; Ostrom 2009). We suggest 
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these extensions based on our long-term collaboration with Ostrom on develop-
ing methods for studying the evolution of action situations over time which she 
saw as a key future challenge (Ostrom 2011). Collective action problems related 
to the creation and maintenance of infrastructure and the distributions of the out-
puts it generates are a central focus of analysis. In Anderies et al. (2004) we used 
shared infrastructure as a common feature of social ecological systems, building 
on Ostrom’s research on small-scale irrigation systems. The key elements of our 
extensions focus on thinking in terms of infrastructure and reemphasizing the 
importance of feedbacks in systems.
3.1. Why think in terms of infrastructure and systems?
We are certainly not the first authors to advocate the importance of thinking in 
terms of infrastructure. In fact, there seems to be a recent movement in both aca-
demic (e.g. Frischmann 2005, 2012) and applied policy contexts (e.g. United 
Nations 2016) recognizing the importance of the concept of infrastructure. This 
movement reconceptualizes and applies notions of infrastructure beyond its tradi-
tional interpretations. Frischmann (2005), for example, refers to “nontraditional 
infrastructure”, e.g. environmental and intellectual infrastructure while the Habitat 
III Zero Draft Outcome Document for the Third United Nations Conference on 
Housing and Sustainable Urban Development refers to cultural and social infra-
structures alongside more traditional transportation and sanitation infrastructures.
This recent work analyzes the ways in which the special nature of infrastruc-
ture affects both how it is provided and its impact on economic activities. For 
example, Frischmann builds on the idea that some resources are “inherently pub-
lic” (Rose 1986) and develops a model of infrastructure that he uses to articulate 
why certain resources he classifies as nontraditional infrastructure ought to be 
managed in an “...openly accessible manner” (Frischmann 2005, 929). Essential 
to this argument is thinking carefully about the many ways infrastructure gener-
ates difficult-to-observe spillovers that, in turn, generate value for society. Not 
considering these values may distort institutional analysis by placing too much 
emphasis on the problem of providing infrastructure and allowances for suppli-
ers to capture the benefits of infrastructure while neglecting the importance of 
demand for the many values infrastructures may provide. It follows, then, that 
we must be clear about the nature of infrastructure itself which, as evidenced by 
Frischmann’s (2012) volume on the subject, is a challenging task. Infrastructure 
is defined by at least three key characteristics:
(i) an “infrastructure” is a coherent structure of any kind, e.g. genomes, 
legal systems, roads and bridges, knowledge and value systems, build-
ings, electrical power grids, and ecosystems that can manipulate mass, 
energy, and information flows,
(ii) different classes of infrastructure can combined to provide affordances 
to produce a variety of mass and information flows we value, and
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(iii) infrastructure requires investment, i.e. entails an opportunity cost, to 
produce or maintain. That is, there is a fundamental trade-off between 
consuming valued flows in the present or directing them toward creat-
ing and maintaining infrastructure to produce future flows.
While few would dispute these definitions, they are not sufficient to distin-
guish infrastructure from what economists have long referred to as capital. The 
 difference between the terms is a matter of customary usage where the terms 
capital or infrastructure conjure notions of private or shared (partially non-rival) 
goods, or smaller or larger scales, respectively. Other factors that may distin-
guish infrastructure is that it is somehow foundational, valued mainly as an input 
 contributing to multiple outputs [captured in (ii)]. Distinctions between these 
terms are difficult to maintain under careful scrutiny. Although we are deeply 
interested in public (or shared) infrastructure and the challenges of producing 
and maintaining it, the work presented here emphasizes the foundational aspect 
of infrastructure in our use of the term.
Like Frischmann, our interest in infrastructure is motivated by how it func-
tions in structuring social and economic processes in ways that can be very dif-
ficult to observe or quantify. While Frischmann focuses on how managing certain 
classes of partially non-rivalrous infrastructures as open access will generate 
positive spillovers that benefit society, our interest lies in how such inherent spill-
overs affect how different classes of infrastructure interact to produce dynamics 
at the system level. Specifically, our work on irrigation systems and other types of 
social-ecological systems (such as reported in this special issue) has led us to rec-
ognize that technology, environment, rules, norms, beliefs, and social bonds are 
intimately intertwined through “spill-overs” that are difficult to detect. Thus when 
we consider investments in particular classes of infrastructure (e.g. “environmen-
tal policy” is an investment in institutional infrastructure) we must be mindful of 
these hidden connections that are inherent to infrastructure. As a result, we sug-
gest that the notion of “Coupled Infrastructure Systems” and the perspective it 
evokes is more appropriate than the term “Social-Ecological Systems”. The latter 
implies there are two distinct domains, the social and the ecological, that operate 
by their own logic. Each system logic can be understood in relative isolation and 
the interactions between the two domains can be identified, studied, and manipu-
lated. The term coupled infrastructure system (CIS), on the other hand, suggests 
that the basic building blocks of all systems in which humans interact with one 
another and their environment (both built and natural) are classes of functional 
infrastructures and that distinctions between “social”, “ecological”, “natural” and 
“built” environments are artificial and can be misleading. The logic of these infra-
structures cannot be understood in isolation and all relevant linkages between 
them cannot be identified.
The 5 main types of infrastructure that constitute CISs are: (1) hard infra-
structure which is human-made structures such as roads, irrigation systems, and 
nuclear power stations (cf. Frischmann 2005, “traditional infrastructure”); (2) soft 
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infrastructure which are collections of human-made “instructions” for using other 
types of infrastructure such as institutional arrangements and decision making 
processes (cf. Frischmann 2005, “intellectual infrastructure”); (3) natural infra-
structure which is hard infrastructure that is not human-made but is critical for 
society, such as wetlands for absorbing and filtering water (cf. Frischmann 2005, 
“environmental infrastructure”); (4) human infrastructure which refers to knowl-
edge (often referred to as “knowledge capital” in economics, cf. Frischmann 
2005, “intellectual infrastructure”); and (5) social infrastructure which refers to 
the relationships we have with others.
In point (ii), our use of the term “affordance”, with which we refer to the pos-
sible outcomes that are accessible to individuals, independent of an individual’s 
ability to perceive this possibility, is a very deliberate reference to the “config-
ural” nature of CISs and is consistent with Frischmann’s demand side theory of 
infrastructure: value is derived from downstream activities to which infrastructure 
is an input. We take this one step further by suggesting that generating value 
requires multiple infrastructures as inputs. For example, a tree does not produce 
wood for building materials. It does, however, provide an affordance for produc-
ing building material to a skilled person with an axe and a kiln to dry the wood. 
Computer hardware is useless without software. The hardware provides only an 
affordance for computational capacity. Likewise, the capacity of roads to provide 
transportation opportunities is limited without institutional arrangements for the 
use of the road. The work in this special issue focuses on how natural (ecosys-
tems), hard human-made (technology), and soft human-made (institutions) infra-
structures interact to produce outcomes in social dilemmas related to public good 
provision and resource governance.
In the remainder of this paper, we argue that the notion CISs can be used to 
extend the IAD and Robustness Frameworks to (1) provide a systematic way of 
thinking that focuses on how these different infrastructures interact in terms of 
the functions they provide that avoids artificial and potentially misleading distinc-
tions between various system elements, and (2) recognize and clarify the “con-
figural” nature of systems, i.e. a minimal set of infrastructure classes is required 
before interesting higher-level organizational patterns emerge (i.e. well-being, 
communities, societies, etc.). When thinking in terms of CISs, the question is not 
“what is the right policy or set of institutions for a particular problem or context?” 
but, rather, “what infrastructures can we influence that might nudge a system to 
evolve toward a robust configuration that produces mass and information flows 
valued by society?”. Put simply, CISs, as technologies in the broadest sense, come 
in bundles and require holistic design that embraces both consciously-designed 
and self-organizing components.
3.2. CISs and the IAD and robustness frameworks
We are now in a position to apply the notions of infrastructure and CISs to exist-
ing frameworks. We emphasize that we are extending existing frameworks rather 
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than introducing a new “CIS framework” out of the blue for two reasons: (1) we 
are hesitant to introduce yet another framework into an already crowded field, 
and, more importantly, (2) the elements of a CIS as we just described do not con-
stitute a framework in the strict Ostrom sense of the word which “...identif[ies] 
the elements and general relationships among these elements that one needs to 
consider for institutional analysis and........provide[s] a general set of variables 
that can be used to analyze all types of institutional arrangements.” (Ostrom 
2011, 8). Rather, the notion of a CIS redefines the basic unit of analysis to which 
institutional analysis is applied and emphasizes the importance of the special 
characteristics of infrastructure to understanding most problems of interest to 
scholars of governance of shared assets in multi-agent systems. By way of com-
parison, the “SES” which is the unit of analysis in what has come to be known as 
the “SES Framework” is not the same as the framework itself.2 SESs are special 
cases of CIS in which the importance of some classes of infrastructure (e.g. natu-
ral infrastructure) are assumed to be more important (or of interest) than others 
(e.g. built infrastructure). Our emphasis on the special features of infrastructure 
begins to flow into the realm of theory as relations among subsets of concepts 
and variables are explored and explained. We can easily apply any of the exist-
ing, intimately related, IAD (Kiser and Ostrom 1982), Robustness (Anderies et al. 
2004), “Multitier” (Ostrom 2007), and “General Sustainability” (Ostrom 2009) 
frameworks using the CIS unit of analysis to enrich their capacity to “..organize 
diagnostic and prescriptive inquiry.” (Ostrom 2011). We will illustrate this point 
using the IAD and Robustness Frameworks as examples.
Because the IAD Framework grew out of the political science and policy 
analysis scholarly traditions its development and use has generally focused on 
the social and institutional domain. For example, the core conceptual unit of the 
IAD is the action situation (Figure 1) “....that can be utilized to describe, analyze, 
predict, and explain behavior within institutional arrangements.” (Ostrom 2011, 
11). Likewise, while reflecting on the background of the IAD, Ostrom makes the 
intended application of the IAD explicit in her remark that the “framework can 
be applied to a variety of important policy questions.” (Ostrom 2011, 7). Ostrom 
notes that because of its social science origins, scholars have “...frequently focused 
on the working parts of the situation itself rather than on the factors underlying 
any particular action situation.” (Ostrom 2011, 21) and goes on to suggest the 
need for a better understanding of the factors that structure action situations and 
how action situations evolve over time through changing perceptions induced by 
recursive interactions. These issues motivated the development of the more gen-
eral SES and Robustness frameworks and, in turn, the extensions we present here.
2
 The actual name of the “SES Framework” is the “Framework for Analyzing Sustainability” (cf. 
title of Ostrom 2009). Ostrom has previously referred to the same framework as a “multitier frame-
work to analyze SESs” (Ostrom 2007). Contraction of such names, as a by product of scientific com-
munities of practice, to “SES Framework” is problematic as terms have specific connotations within 
those communities that do not translate will into other communities.
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The CIS perspective contributes to institutional analysis on two levels. First, 
at the level of the action situation, the CIS perspective responds to Ostrom’s call 
to better understand factors that structure action situations by re-framing “external 
variables” as functional infrastructures (Figure 1A) while emphasizing dynamic 
feedback processes that produce recursive interactions. Second, the CIS perspec-
tive can help advance understanding at the system level, zooming out from the 
action situation by envisioning it as an information processing infrastructure that 
interacts with other infrastructures to affect system level features such as  resilience 
and robustness [Figure 1B as adapted from Anderies et al. (2004)]. Ostrom’s 
External variables
(Endogenized in CIS)
Hard human-made and
natural infrastructure
Participants
Action
situation
Interactions
Outcomes
Evaluative
criteria
Human and social
infrastructure
A
B
Soft infrastructure
Exogenous
drivers
Exogenous
drivers
Exogenous
drivers
Rules–in–use
Resource
Resource users
Public infrastructure
Biophysical conditions
Attributes of the community
Public infrastructure
providers
Figure 1: (A) The IAD framework from a CIS perspective. Biophysical Conditions, Attributes 
of the community and Rules-in-use are conceived of as infrastructures. (B) The “Robustness 
of CIS Framework” (or “CIS Framework” for short). The italicized text and white ovals and 
boxes show the original Anderies et al. (2004) Framework. The dashed shapes illustrate how 
the external variables Biophysical Conditions, Attributes of the community and Rules-in-use of 
Ostrom’s IAD are parsed in the Robustness Framework. The grey boxes labelled with NI, SI, HI, 
SHMI, HHMI represent how natural, social, human, soft human-made, and hard human-man 
infrastructures are distributed across the system. The grey circles labelled with AS represent 
the potential numerous linked action situations. Finally, the grey hexagons labelled with S rep-
resent spillovers. See text for further explanation.
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Design Principles that are the focus of this special issue are, as we discuss in more 
detail below, concise descriptions of information processing infrastructure.
More recent instantiations of the IAD framework (e.g. Ostrom 2005, and 
later) include dynamics and feedbacks when evaluative criteria are applied to 
outcomes, generating signals that feed back to the action situation itself and to 
the “external variables” (dashed lines, Figure 1A). Further, the IAD implicitly 
recognizes two timescales, one fast in which signals feed back to the action situ-
ation itself, and one slow in which signals feed back to the key structuring exter-
nal variables. Ostrom’s call to advance institutional analysis generally focuses 
on understanding the faster (inner) loop – i.e. how do the dynamics of recursive 
action situations play out in terms of the capacity for groups to engage in collec-
tive action. The CIS perspective focuses more on the slower (outer) loop. At that 
scale, multiple operational-level action situations related to daily management 
of natural and hard human made infrastructures (the faster inner loop) interact 
with collective-choice-level action situations related to public good provision. 
Together, these linked action situations structure dynamic change in the CIS. At 
this level of analysis, we are interested in what constellations of infrastructures 
support robust networks of linked action situations and institutional structures 
and, in turn, robust and resilient CISs capable of delivering wellbeing in the face 
of change.
We will now illustrate how adopting the CIS unit of analysis and thinking 
in terms of infrastructure extends the IAD and Robustness Frameworks by way 
of some concrete examples. First, we reframe the “external variables” in the 
IAD as shown in Figure 1A. The biophysical conditions are constituted by both 
human-made hard and natural hard infrastructure. Attributes of the community 
include human and social infrastructure (knowledge and social capital) within the 
community. Finally, rules-in-use are soft human-made infrastructure. Figure 1B 
shows the extension of the Robustness of SES Framework to the Robustness of 
CIS Framework. The key additions emphasize networks of action situations that 
influence the interactions between different infrastructures and the importance of 
positive and negative spillovers that are important in structuring CISs but can be 
difficult to observe or predict. It is important to point out that Figure 1A and B 
are intimately related and capture the same phenomenon on different time scales 
and levels of analysis. On short time scales during which the characteristics of 
infrastructure remain approximately constant (i.e. can be treated as “external vari-
ables”), we can zoom in on any of the action situations in Figure 1B and effec-
tively represent it with the IAD shown in Figure 1A. The examples in the next 
section will help illustrate how this reframing in terms of infrastructure can be 
used to generate new insights.
3.3. Examples
We begin with some examples using Ostrom’s notion of the internal structure 
of an action situation that emphasizes ‘institutions as rules’ shown in Figure 2 
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(in black). Here, elements from the seven classes of rules mentioned above deter-
mine what positions can be assumed by actors in the action situation such as 
chair or director (through position rules), which actors may assume those pos-
tions, e.g. must be a member of the village, (through boundary rules), and what 
actions actors in positions can take (through choice rules). Choices are linked to 
outcomes via how much information actors have (through information rules), 
and how much control individual actors have (through aggregation rules). 
Potential outcomes are limited by scope rules. Finally, actors make decisions 
in action situations by assigning costs and benefits to outcomes which are con-
ditioned by payoff rules. Thus, by restricting some actions and enabling others, 
institutions structure the action situation and move the system of recurring action 
situations toward desirable outcomes. In this view, institutions are protocols that 
help animate CISs given biophysical constraints.
While this view of institutions as rules is powerful, the extended IAD sug-
gests two considerations for an alternative view of institutions and governance 
that may better characterize some situations:
1. The notion of governance should more strongly emphasize the impor-
tance of features other than rule-structured social interactions in pro-
ducing outcomes. In some cases, outcomes may depend less on social 
interactions than on other processes and, as a result, the details of social 
interactions in a particular case may not help us understand “successful 
governance”. Thinking of governance as an infrastructure system high-
lights the practical aspects of effective conflict resolution, monitoring, and 
Potential
Outcomes
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rulesLinked to
Net costs
and benefits
assigned to
Payoff
rules
Actors
Actions
Boundary
Position
rules
Choice
rules
rules
Assigned to
Assigned to
Positions
Emerge from
Emerge from
Technology Technology
Control
over
Information
about
Information
rules
Aggregation
rules
Figure 2: Ostrom’s schematic for the internal structure of the action situation emphasizing the 
role of rule clusters in structuring action situations. Adapted from Ostrom (2011, figure 3).
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 sanctioning  processes that typically receive less attention in the literature 
than  institutional arrangements (understood as rules and norms), trust, and 
communication. In some irrigation systems, the natural and hard human-
made infrastructure generate positive spillovers that substitute for institu-
tional functions. Specifically, monitoring functions can be a by-product 
of the operation of the water distribution systems in irrigation systems in 
steep terrain. In this way, there is a postive spillover from collective-choice 
level institutional arrangements for provisioning hard infrastructure that 
relieve pressure on collective-choice level institutional arrangements for 
monitoring that acts through operational-level arrangements about water 
distribution that depend intimately on the functioning of the canal infra-
structure and land form (natural infrastructure). This example illustrates 
the complex interplay and spillover effects among multiple infrastructures 
as depicted in Figure 1B.
2. It is likely that the dynamic evolution of action situations involves interac-
tions at several time scales that are difficult to identify, giving rise to subtle 
interactions that are difficult to disentangle. Such a view acknowledges the 
difficulty, for example, of understanding how formal and informal institu-
tions interact, how institutions interact with perceptions, and how all these 
interact with technology.
These two points suggest that in some situations we may think of actions as 
 bi-directional and add “emerge from” (shown in red) to “assigned to.” within the 
action situation. In this case, actors are constantly generating new self-images and 
mental models as they occupy positions in networks of social relations in essence 
defining new actors and new possible actions. This process occurs on relatively 
fast timescales on the “inner” loop in Figure 1A. Likewise, arrows between the 
action situation and rules regarding information, control, outcomes, and costs and 
benefits are in the opposite direction (again shown in red) are added. In the tradi-
tional view of institutions, these red arrows may represent collective choice and 
constitutional choice arrangements operating on a slower timescale (“outer” loop 
in Figure 1) whereby rules are changed in a highly rule-structured way. The CIS 
alternative view suggests that in some situations institutions are not rules that 
guide action and animate social interactions but, rather, are simply reflections 
of common knowledge regarding self-sustaining features of social interactions 
(Aoki 2001, 2007), i.e. a by-product of interactions between human and social 
infrastructures. Rules are then codified public representations of this common 
knowledge. Aoki (2007) suggests that we might label the black arrow and text 
version of Figure 2 as the “exogenous” and the red version the “endogenous” 
view of institutions. In the endogenous view, institutions are emergent features of 
the dynamic interaction between the various classes of infrastructure that consti-
tute the action situation generated by a large number of microsituational variables. 
This view has implications for how we might think of institutional design and 
policy analysis.
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Another example from lobster fisheries illustrates the importance of point (1). 
Lobster traps have buoys that convey information about who is fishing where and 
the way lobster traps are set and recovered strongly conditions catch. Lobstering 
technology considerably reduces the costs of monitoring (painted buoys are easy 
to see) and sanctioning (traps are easy to cut/destroy). The spillovers from lobster 
fishing technology (hard infrastructure) combined with norms related the use of 
painted buoys (social/human infrastructure) that allows the fishers to avoid invest-
ment in more expensive monitoring and sanctioning arrangements may thus be 
a more important determinant of effective governance than formal institutional 
arrangements. A CIS may thus be an accidental beneficiary of the configuration 
of its infrastructure by which it was able to “solve” a perceived (by an outside 
observer) social dilemma that actually doesn’t exist.
These examples illustrate how the difficult-to-quantify spillover aspect of 
infrastructure helps clarify subtleties of the functioning of monitoring and sanc-
tioning at the level of the action situation. Our next example of the Prisoner’s 
dilemma as a metaphor for the tragedy of open-access is an illustration of the 
importance of the configural nature of CISs. Readers of this journal will know the 
story of the prisoners dilemma in which two prisoners are isolated, not allowed 
to communicate, and are offered a rather nasty choice to provide certain informa-
tion. This situation generates payoffs in an abstract game to illustrate one type of 
social dilemma. This is a perfectly reasonable story. The problem arises when this 
abstract game is applied to other situations such as overuse of some shared stock 
such as a pasture, fishery, forest, or atmosphere. The problem is that the infra-
structure configuration of the prisoner’s dilemma simply does not apply to these 
other situations. In a very insightful paper, Cole and Grossman (2010) explain 
why the “[h]erder problem is not a prisoner’s dilemma” in terms of the fact that 
the institutional infrastructures in the two situations are very different. In the 
Prisoners’ dilemma story, the relevant institutions stem from criminal law focused 
on establishing guilt and imposing sanctions. Thus, the payoff rules are designed 
to promote defection. The CIS perspective suggests that we consider the role of 
other infrastructures as well. In fact, some combination of hard human-made (the 
prison cell) and human infrastructure (skilled, uncorrupted guards) is required to 
prevent communication. Since there are typically no such payoff rules to promote 
defection or infrastructures to prevent communication between herders in herder 
systems, it makes little sense to apply the prisoners’ dilemma logic to such cases. 
So while the prisoners’ dilemma provides some insight into social dilemmas, it 
arguably provides very little in the way of general principles for designing effec-
tive governance for CISs. In this example, the CISs perspective highlights what 
we might refer to as the “overlooked configuration constraints” problem. More 
simply put, we must be careful not to ascribe too much importance to the intrin-
sic decision-making behavior of agents in explaining outcomes that are strongly 
constrained by context.
We close with an example that zooms out from the action situation to the system 
level (as in Figure 1B). Payment for ecosystem services (PES) has become a  popular 
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approach to manage ecosystems or, in the language of CISs, to invest in natural 
infrastructure. Issues related to the challenges and opportunities for implementation 
of PES have received considerable attention in the literature. Specifically, PES is an 
appeal to develop and implement market-like mechanisms to generate investment 
in natural infrastructure where no markets exist. However, because ecosystems are 
infrastructure, and infrastructure is foundational, contributing value primarily as an 
input to many downstream activities that are difficult to characterize and quantify, 
markets are not appropriate. Research in this area reflects this fact, calling for the 
need for science to characterize and measure the bundles of services ecosystems 
provide and link them to value streams (Farley and Costanza 2010; Wong et al. 
2015). This is exactly the supply side focus that Frischmann (2005) suggests will 
ultimately fail to fully account for how natural infrastructure may be used to gener-
ate social benefits. Science is not up to the task to discover and assign value to all 
the potential value steams natural infrastructure may generate.
We conclude our set of examples with another important issue made salient 
by the CIS perspective that we refer to as the “missing infrastructure” problem. 
Commodification is a basic and natural precursor to the operation of market-
based logic. The market-based logic of PES thus requires the quantification and 
commodification of affordances from natural infrastructure. For most products 
exchanged in markets, commodification infrastructure is relatively simple, e.g. 
products can be enumerated using a counting system (soft human-made infra-
structure). Where counting is impractical or costly as with grains or liquids, scales 
and standard volume vessels can be used to enumerate them. In the absence of 
simple commodification infrastructure for affordances from natural infrastruc-
ture, highly specialized additional knowledge and scientific capacity (human and 
human-made infrastructure) are required. Attempting to implement PES in a sys-
tem without considering this required commodification infrastructure can gener-
ate unintended consequences. Typically, one of two things happens: affordances 
from natural infrastructure are reduced in number and simplified, or experts from 
governments and NGO’s fill the void (assume the role of public infrastructure 
providers to provide public infrastructure as in Figure 1B.) These gatekeepers of 
the value (and, thus, supply) of infrastructure may not serve the best interests of 
all potential stakeholders (Scales 2015) with the result that costs and benefits of 
PES will be unevenly distributed. The CIS perspective, with its systems view and 
emphasis on the configural nature of infrastructure immediately leads to the key 
question regarding PES: how does the cost of providing the necessary commodifi-
cation infrastructure for PES schemes compare to the investments they generate? 
This is a quite different question than those being addressed in the PES literature.
We conclude this section with one final general feature of CISs: inertia. The 
fundamental properties (i–iii) of infrastructure impact collective action problems 
in important ways. The creation of shared infrastructure typically requires invest-
ment from a large number of people. Infrastructure requires investment to main-
tain it’s performance at the levels for which it was initially designed. We have to 
invest resources in the form of time and energy to maintain roads, enforce rules, 
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sustain wetlands, keep up our knowledge and maintain relationships. Finally, the 
outcomes generated from the interactions of infrastructures often have distribu-
tional effects. How are the benefits allocated and access arranged? Inequality and 
power differences are important characteristics of coupled infrastructure systems 
that can impact their performance.
Another important feature of infrastructure is the importance of path depen-
dency. Investments made to create new infrastructure can have lasting effects, 
both directly and through multiple spill-over effects. Transitioning from a fos-
sil fuel based energy system to one based on distributed renewable resources 
is hindered by the sunk costs associated with the infrastructure and the values, 
beliefs, and perceptions that support the existing energy system. Changing human 
behavior can be hindered by existing habits, entrenched social norms, and social 
commitments. A common saying is that science progresses with every funeral, 
referring to the reluctance of the existing scientific establishment to adopt new 
scientific paradigms.
Looking at systems on a longer time scale enables us to look at the interac-
tions of different types of infrastructure and generate understanding about which 
configurations of infrastructure enhance resilience or enable transformations. If 
we look at the rapid change in communication technology since the 1990s, we see 
that the combination of hard infrastructure (devices, internet, etc), soft infrastruc-
ture (world wide web, software applications), and social infrastructure (social net-
works in person and online) have led to a rapid co-evolution of the information 
transmission and exchange infrastructure that defines our age.
The analysis of these examples illustrates how the CIS perspective, by height-
ening our awareness of the configural nature of infrastructure systems, of the many 
spill-overs inherent to infrastructure, and of the value of conceptualizing institu-
tions as emergent features of interacting infrastructures, causes us to ask a broader 
set of questions regarding institutional design: What is the missing infrastructure? 
What are the unobserved spill-overs that may make or break the system? In what 
ways can inertia impact the performance of institutional design? We argue that 
careful consideration of these questions will lead to better institutional analysis 
and design. With that in mind, we conclude with a view of Ostrom’s Institutional 
Design Principles as infrastructure.
3.4. The Design Principles as infrastructure in CISs
This special feature is motivated by the analysis of how the presence or absence of 
DPs relates to the potential for succesful governance of shared infrastructure in a 
particular CIS. As mentioned above, the DPs describe characteristics of the infor-
mation processing infrastructure that is essential for feedback systems to function. 
Viewed as part of a CIS,
1. Clearly defined boundaries are essential for any form of public infra-
structure to monitor the state of natural infrastructure (biophysical bound-
aries) and transmit it to the relevant decision-makers (social boundaries).
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2. Congruence between local conditions and institutional arrangements 
amplifies positive spillovers and attenuates negative spillovers between 
different infrastructures that reduce the costs of providing shared infra-
structure, coordinating activities, and monitoring system behavior.
3. Collective choice arrangements provide a mechanism by which informa-
tion about system outputs (outcomes), processed by multiple agents in a 
decentralized fashion is translated into coordinated actions that feed back 
into the system as inputs.
4. Monitoring of individual behavior is essential to ensure that appropriate 
feedback actions are actually being implemented.
5. Graduated sanctions provide a means by which deviations in the behav-
ior of feedback processes can be corrected. Rapid corrections lead to insta-
bilities in feedback systems, thus the importance of graduated sanctions.
6. Conflict resolution mechanisms provide a mechanism for reconciling (1) 
“measurement error” that takes the form of conflicting interpretations of 
information, and (2) the consequences of undesired outcomes for (some 
of) the participants.
7. Recognition of rights to organize increases the fidelity of information 
processing and strengthens the linkage between information processing 
and appropriate feedback actions through empowerment of local appro-
priators to devise their own rules.
8. Nested enterprises provide capacity for information processing (deci-
sion-making) and action at multiple temporal and spatial scales.
It is well known that regulatory feedbacks operating at multiple scales are essen-
tial for mainting complex structures over time (Csete and Doyle 2002). Viewed 
as a component of CISs, Ostrom’s DPs are guidelines for the design of regulatory 
feedback network structures capable of maintaining complex social structures 
involving shared infrastructure. In this light, the results of the empirical work in 
this special feature suggesting that infrastructure components reflecting almost all 
the DPs are required for success in many cases is not surprising. The analogy is an 
electrical circuit with hundreds of components that may not function if just one is 
removed. A glance through the list of DPs above should convince the reader that 
most are required for the fully functioning regulatory feedbacks that are essential 
for “good governance”.
4. Research challenges and opportunities for CISs
In this paper, we have developed an infrastructure lens through which to view 
the problem of governance of shared resources. This lens enabled us to extend 
the original Robustness Framework and link it more directly with the IAD 
Framework. Through several examples, we have attempted to demonstrate that 
the resulting “CIS Framework” can be used to examine and explain problems 
associated with governing shared infrastructure that may have previously been 
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overlooked. There is a growing body of work on the importance of infrastructure 
in the context of governance of SESs that has stimulated articles, special features 
in journals, conference panels, and, given our collaboration with Ostrom over 
the years on this topic, numerous direct inquiries to us about how Ostrom’s SES 
framework can be operationalized for the management of infrastructure systems. 
Our answer is to employ the CIS Framework.
We will close by introducing some research opportunities that emerge from 
potential applications of the CIS Framework. As discussed in Ratajczyk et al. 
(2016) a critical challenge in coding case studies is a consistent mutual under-
standing of the qualitative information available. Although we discuss the results 
in this special issue from the perspective of CPR systems, we began using the 
CIS view during the project which provided a helpful consistent terminology for 
our team. Future versions of the coding protocols will be more in line with the 
perspective provided by the CIS Framework.
Secondly, a challenge that the CIS Framework helps address is the dynamic, 
multi-scale characteristics of many resource systems which are difficult to code. 
An infrastructure perspective may help by providing consistent terminology that 
can be easily understood and used across multiple disciplines such as econom-
ics, engineering, and political science. An example might be to code the rate of 
decline of the performance of particular classes of infrastructure in a given sys-
tem; a critical feature of many systems that a focus on rules and social interactions 
might overlook.
Thirdly, the CIS Framework enables researchers to broaden the scope of case 
studies to include, for example, challenges in urban systems for which the SES 
Framework, with its emphasis on ecological systems, is not well suited. In fact, 
one of the main challenges in the coming years will be to maintain the performance 
of hard infrastructure such as energy and freshwater production and distribution 
systems as well as road and rail systems. Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy had major 
impacts in New Orleans and New York and demonstrated the vulnerability of hard 
infrastructure to natural shocks. However, this is not just an engineering problem 
(LePatner 2010; Karvonen 2011). We argue that a broader perspective is needed 
to study these types of problems, and that looking at the interactions among dif-
ferent types of infrastructure, including difficult-to-measure spillovers, is a step 
in the right direction. For example, Mexico City is built on a dry lake bed, has 
flooding problems, but at the same time lacks the capacity for reliable distribu-
tion of clean freshwater to most neighborhoods. Many problems associated with 
different infrastructure systems converge in this case including those affecting an 
under provision of maintenance of infrastructure, others that result in a low level 
of waste water treatment capacity within Mexico City, and still others related to 
collection of garbage which, when not done properly, leaves garbage in the street 
which can end up clogging the water flow systems.
We hope that our reflection on some of the lessons learned from the research 
reported in this special issue and the introduction of the notion of CISs will stimu-
late a discussion in the commons research community about how we can work 
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together to improve the comparative analysis of case studies of shared resources 
beyond the scope Ostrom originally addressed. We hope this fosters the develop-
ment of new theory and new communities of practice.
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